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Jay ~ a r l i s l e *

During the 1999-2000 survey year the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has issued at least twenty-five res
judicata decisions' expanding the doctrines of claim preclusion2 and
issue preclusion. The court liberally applied claim preclusion but
infrequently applied the more expansive doctrine of issue preclusion.3
Also, the Second Circuit released over fifty unpublished decisions4 that
affect the rights of pro se litigants appearing before the court.5 These
decisions demonstrate the court's immense respect for the doctrine of
res judicata. Similarly, the decisions illustrate the extent to which the

*

Professor of Law, Pace University Law School; Editor, Second Circuit Digest,
1990-1994.
1. See infra notes 19-20, 30, 39, 41, 43, 46-49, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63-64, 66, 69-70
and accompanying text.
2. Claim preclusion is sometimes referred to as res judicata. Claim preclusion
has been defined by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit as
follows: After a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction, res judicata bars subsequent litigation between the same parties and those
in privity with them involving the same cause of action. See Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc. v.
Hessen (In re Teltronics Servs., Inc.), 762 F.2d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 1985). "If subsequent
litigation arises from the same cause of action, both those matters actually offered to
sustain the claim and those that might have been offered in the prior action are barred
from being relitigated; that is, there is claim preclusion." Rezzonico v. H. & R. Block,
Inc., 182 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 1999).
3. Issue preclusion is sometimes referred to as collateral estoppel. The Second
Circuit has defined issue preclusion as follows:
If subsequent litigation arises from a different cause of action, the prior
judgment bars only those matters or issues common to both actions that were
expressly or by necessary implication adjudicated in the prior litigation. This
prong of res judicata is referred to as issue preclusion. The Supreme Court
has stated that issue preclusion means that when an issue has been determined
by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the
same parties in any future lawsuit.
Rezzonico, 182 F.3d at 148 (quoting Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222,232 (1994)).
4. See infra note 70.
5. The majority of these law suits are civil rights (42 U.S.C. 5 1983) and Title VII
litigation involving allegations of discrimination and unlawful termination of
employment.
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court relies on the doctrine to achieve finality, to prevent inconsistent
judgments and to allocate judicial resource^.^ This survey article will
review some of the court's significant decisions and comment on future
trends for application of the law of res judicata in the Second Circuit.

In its broadest sense, the term res judicata has been used by the
Second Circuit to refer to a variety of concepts dealing with the
preclusive effects of a judgment on subsequent litigation.' Claim
preclusion is the doctrine that once a claim is brought to a final
conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series
of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if
seeking a different remedy.' Issue preclusion basically precludes a party
from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly
raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or
those in privity, whether the tribunals or causes of action are the same.9
Its typical application occurs when one of the parties to a civil action
argues that preclusive effect should be given to one or more issues
determined in an earlier civil action between the same parties in the
same jurisdiction.I0 The United States Supreme Court has explained the
6. See Jay Carlisle, Getting a Full Bite of the Apple: When Should the Doctrine of
Issue Preclusion Make an Administrative or Arbitral Determination Binding in a Court
L. REV. 63,84-94 (1986).
of law?,55 FORDHAM
7. Leather v. Ten Eyck, 180 F.3d 420,423 (2d Cir. 1999).
8. L-Tec Elecs. Corp. v. Cougar Elec. Org., Inc., 198 F.3d 85, 87-88 (2d Cir.
1999) ("The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents a plaintiff from
relitigating claims that were or could have been raised in a prior action against the same
defendant where that action has reached a final judgment on the merits.").
9. Johnson v. Arbitrium (Cayman Islands) Handels A.G., 198 F.3d 342, 346-47
(2d Cir. 1999). The Second Circuit points out that the doctrine of collateral estoppel or
issue preclusion bars the relitigation of issues actually litigated and decided in the prior
proceeding as long as that determination was essential to that judgment. The court
states that the
[alpplication o f . . . collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is central to the
purpose for which civil courts have been established, the conclusive resolution
of disputes within their jurisdictions. To preclude parties from contesting
matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their
adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits,
conserves judicial resources, and foster reliance on judicial action by
minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.
Id. (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979)).
10. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979) (quoting B.
MOORE,
J.D., LUCAS
& T.S. CURRIER,FEDERAL
PRACTICE
5 0.405(1), 622-24 (2d ed.
1974)). See generally Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (setting forth
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difference between claim preclusion and issue preclusion in Parklane
II
Hosiery Co. v. Shore:
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars
a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same
cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand,
the second action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the
prior suit precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the
12
outcome of the first action.

The concepts of claim preclusion and issue preclusion are from the
common lawI3but each doctrine has a different origin. Claim preclusion
is a Roman law concept while issue preclusion originated in Germanic
law.I4 The policies supporting these doctrines include many of society's
desires: to promote fairness;" to prevent inconsistent judgments and to
achieve uniformity and certainty;'ho finalize disputes among the
parties;'' and to conserve judicial resources.I8 These policy concerns
underlie each of the Second Circuit's res judicata decisions during the
survey year.

the modem formulation of issue preclusion); Cromwell v. County of Sacramento, 94
U.S. 351, 352-55 (1876) (setting forth fundamental historical differences between claim
preclusion and issue preclusion).
11. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
12. Id. at 326.
13. See Carlisle, supra note 6, at 66.
14. See generally Robert Wyners Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel By
Record to Res Judicata, 35 ILL. L. REV. 41, 41-42 (1940) (translating Seelman, Der
Rechtszug im alteren deutschen Recht, 107 Gierkes Untersuchungen zur deutschen
Staats-und Rechtsgenchichte 90, 103, 198-99 (191 I)).
15. Concepts of fair play and due process have consistently been important policy
considerations for district courts in the Second Circuit and for the circuit when
considering issue preclusion. S.E.C. v. Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 303-04
(2d Cir. 1999).
16. See id. See also Brainerd Cunie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of
the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN.L. REV. 281,289 (1957).
17. See Monarch, 192 F.3d at 303-04.
18. See Leather v. Ten Eyck, 180 F.3d 420,424-25 (1999).
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A. Doctrine Applied

Two key survey year decisions applying the doctrine of claim
preclusion are El Bohio Public Development Corp. v. ~ i u l i a n i 'and
~
Waldman v. Village of Kiryas ~oel." In Waldman, the circuit court,
speaking through Judge Guido Calabresi, affirmed the judgment of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
dismissing Waldman's civil rights suit against the village of Kiryas Joel
and its officials. The suit sought to dissolve the village because its
existence and operation as a theocracy violated the establishment clause
of the United States Constitution. The district court, by Judge
Bamngton D. Parker, Jr., dismissed the action on res judicata (claim
preclusion) grounds." The court reasoned that Waldman had previously
litigated many of the alleged facts and claims in an earlier action against
the same defendants." The district court held that "because this claim
'arise[s] out of the same nucleus of operative facts' as the earlier suit
and should have been brought together with the prior action, Waldman
is currently barred from seeking the relief he now requests."*'
Judge Calabresi explained, "Res judicata . . . makes a final, valid
judgment conclusive on the parties, and those in privity with them, as to
all matters, fact and law, [that] were or should have been adjudicated in
the pr~ceeding."'~ He noted that Waldman should have brought his
claim for the dissolution of the village as part of the prior actions.
Waldman argued that the current suit did not share a common nucleus
of operative facts with the prior one, and that it would have been
premature to have requested the dissolution of the village in the earlier
action because the facts upon which that claim could have been based
did not exist at that time." In rejecting these arguments, Judge
19. 208 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000).
20. 207 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2000).
21. The United States District Court concluded that Waldman's suit against
defendants-appellees, the Village and its officials, was barred by claim preclusion as a
result of a prior suit against the Village in which Waldman was a named plaintiff.
Waldman v. Vill. of Kiryas Joel, 39 F. Supp. 2d 370, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
22. Id. at 377.
23. Waldman, 207 F.3d at 107.
24. Id. at 108.
25. Id. at 112.
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Calabresi identified three indicia as being crucial to a determination of
what constitutes a common nucleus of operative facts. First, the court
must look to whether the underlying facts are related in time, space,
origin, or motivation. Second, the court must also consider whether
these facts form a convenient trial unit. Third, whether treatment as a
unit conforms to the parties' expectations should be considered.
Searching the records for the prior and current actions, he concluded all
three indicia had been satisfied. Judge Calabresi also rejected
Waldman's "new facts" argument. He stated, "It is true that res
judicata will not bar a suit based upon legally significant acts occurring
after the filing of a prior suit that was itself based upon earlier acts."26
However, he concluded that Waldman's references to "new facts" were
"nothing more than additional instances of what was previously
a~serted."~'Finally, Judge Calabresi noted Waldman could not use "the
mere inclusion of a few post Waldman I Village acts, themselves
satisfactorily remediable through appropriately tailored relief, to
resurrect a claim, grounded almost entirely upon pre-1997 events

....

,928

The Second Circuit's decision in Waldman extends the "might
have been litigated" aspect of claim preclusion. It dismisses claims the
court recognizes as having an independent basis for being heard in the
district court and suggests the circuit is encouraging district court judges
to more expansively apply the doctrine of claim p r e c l u ~ i o n . ~ ~
In El Bohio Public Development Corp., the circuit court affirmed
the district court's3' grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of
New York and two city officials dismissing El Bohio's challenge to the

26. Id.at 113.
27. Waldman, 207 F.3d at 113.
28. Id. at 114.
(SECOND)OF JUDGMENTS
5 24 (1982). See also L-Tec
29. See RESTATEMENT
Elecs. Corp. v. Cougar Elec. Org., Inc., 198 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1999). The
Restatement (Second) of Judgments "might have been" or "could have been" litigated
requirements for claim preclusion should be applied in a practical and pragmatic
manner. Anything arguably "might have been" litigated but the circuit court's
expansive application of this "same transaction" requirement is frequently unfair. See
KANE& MILLER,CIVILPROCEDURE
5 14.4 (3d ed. 1999).
generally FRIEDENTHAL,
30. El Bohio Pub. Dev. Corp. v. Guiliani, No. 99-7829, 2000 WL 326406 (2d Cir.
Mar. 28,2000). Judge Michael Mukasey had noted that El Bohio's opposition presented
various facts outside the pleadings and converted defendant's motion to dismiss, under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, into a summary judgment motion
and granted it, holding that plaintiffs had embellished their claims with later events that
were previously known or should have been known to them. Id.
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City's sale of certain property.31 The district court had dismissed El
Bohio's action on the ground that it was barred by res judicata (claim
preclusion) due to a previous suit instituted in the courts of the State of
New York by El Bohio, presenting a pre-sale challenge to the same
tran~action.~'The district court, by Judge Michael Mukasey, stressed
that the "plaintiffs have embellished their present claim with later events
. . . [blut the gravamen of their claim would have to be proved . . . out of
the same skein of known facts underlying the initial
The circuit
court's affirmance of Judge Mukasey relied on Kremer v. Chemical
Construction Corp.,34 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court held that when
applying claim preclusion the Second Circuit must afford the same
preclusive effect that the New York state courts give to their own
judgments.35 Also, the circuit court cited O'Brien v. City of ~ ~ r a c u s e ~ ~
for the proposition that the right to relitigate does not arise from later
Several other circuit court opinions, applying the doctrine of claim
,~~
preclusion, merit attention. In Skeete v. Pathmark Stores, ~ n c . the
circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs Title VII
action on the grounds that claims previously litigated in New York state
court could not be relitigated in a federal court.39 In United States v.
~ l a h e r t ~ ,the
" circuit court affirmed the district court's dismissal of

31. Id.
32. The New York State Supreme Court rejected El Bohio's challenge to the
proposed sale, granted summary judgment to the City, and held that the City's actions
were within the conditions established for the property's use by the Board of Estimate.
The Appellate Division denied El Bohio's appeal in a short opinion on October 13,
1998. El Bohio Pub. Dev. Corp. v. Diamond, 711 N.E.2d 201 (N.Y. 1998). The New
York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal, thus bringing to a close El Bohio's statecourt challenge to the property's sale.
33. El Bohio, 2000 WL 326406, at *2 (citing Smith v. Russell Sage Coll., 54
N.Y.2d 185, 194,429 N.E.2d 746, 749 (1981)) (alteration in original).
34. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
35. Id. at 466, 482-83 n.4; see also U.S. CONST.art. IV, 9 1; 28 U.S.C. 9 1738
(2000).
36. 54 N.Y.2d 353,429 N.E.2d 1158 (1981).
37. The circuit court expressly relied on the language of the New York Court of
Appeals in Reilly v. Reid, 45 N.Y.2d 24, 28, 379 N.E.2d 172, 175 (1978)
("Afterthoughts or after discoveries however understandable and morally forgivable are
generally not enough to create a right to litigate anew.").
38. No. 98-9399, 1999 WL 447634 (2d Cir. June 16, 1999).
39. Id. at *12 ("Having reviewed the record, we agree with the district court that
Skeete received a full and fair adjudication of his employment discrimination claims in
state court. Accordingly, he cannot now relitigate those claims in a federal forum.").
40. No. 97-6295, 1999 WL 66153 (2d Cir. Feb. 10, 1999).
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defendant's counterclaims on claim preclusion ground^.^' In Ciuffetelli
v. Apple Bank For ~ a v i n ~ the
s , ~circuit
~
court affirmed the district
court's dismissal of plaintiffs negligence actions on claim preclusion
grounds.43 The court stated that "[p]laintiffs' assertion that the majority
of the acts complained of occurred after the execution of the agreement
does not save their negligence claim."" The court explained that the
plaintiffs presented no evidence to support a finding that their claims
were meritorious. Finally, on December 29, 1999, the circuit court
issued its last res judicata decision of the twentieth century.45In Farrell
v. ~ a t a k ithe
, ~ circuit
~
affirmed the district court's dismissal of a pro se
civil rights action on the grounds of claim preclusion. Farrell, a
disbarred attorney, filed his first pro se complaint in the southern district
on March 19, 1997, alleging that New York state disciplinary bodies on
two occasions refused to investigate his misconduct charges against
judges and members of disciplinary committees, thereby violating a
number of his constitutional rights. The district court, by Judge
Deborah Batts, dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) there
was no basis for the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over the
underlying suit, (2) the defendants were immune from suit, and (3) no
meritorious issues were stated in the complaint. In a second action,
filed on November 2, 1998, Farrell named the same parties as
defendants and relied upon facts substantially identical to those fully
litigated and adjudicated on the merits in the proceeding before Judge

41. Id. Counterclaims that could have been raised as direct or counterclaims in a
prior action may arise out of the same transaction and occurrence. They will be barred
either under Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (compulsory
counterclaim) or under principles of res judicata or defensive claim preclusion.
42. No. 99-7741,2000 WL 340388 (2d Cir. Mar. 30, 2000).
43. On or about March 22, 1995, Apple commenced a foreclosure action against a
number of properties owned by the plaintiff. On June 30, 1995, the parties agreed to
sign an agreement disposing of the foreclosure action. Plaintiffs then filed an action
against Apple and other named defendants. The district court ordered the dismissal of
plaintiffs negligence claim, holding that the allegations with respect to all acts
occuning before the June 30, 1995, agreement were subject to the agreement and thus
barred by claim preclusion. The doctrine was not applicable to allegedly negligent
actions occuning after the execution of the agreement.
44. Ciuffetelli, 2000 WL 340388, at *2.
45. See Farrell v. Pataki, 205 F.3d 1322 (2d Cir. 1999), which was an appeal from
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York by fonner Chief
Judge Thomas Griesa
46. 205 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1999).
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Batts. The district court dismissed the second action under the doctrine
of claim preclusion and the circuit court affirmed.47

B. Doctine Not Applied
In Devlin v. Transportation Communications International ~ n i o n , ~ *
the Second Circuit, speaking through former Chief Judge James Oakes,
reversed the district court and held that plaintiffs claims under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA) should not be barred
under the doctrine of res judicata (claim preclusion).49 Judge Oakes
opined that the district court held that federal age discrimination related
to the medical benefits "were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We
disagree, and we vacate and remand."" Judge Oakes noted the district
court's reliance on Woods v. Dunlop Tire or^.^' and devoted a
considerable portion of his opinion to distinguishing Woods from
~ e v l i n . ' ~Woods stands for the proposition that claim preclusion may be
applied to prevent relitigation of a related claim not properly joined by a
litigant. Judge Oakes held the district court should have considered
consolidation of Devlin's claims prior to the application of res judicata.
He stated:

47. The district court had certified, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 3 1915(a), that any
appeal from its order of dismissal would not be taken in good faith. Id. at 1332. See
also Howard v. New York Times Co., 182 F.3d 899 (2d Cir. 1999) (precluding
Plaintiffs Title VII claims by claim preclusion because they were resolved in an earlier
action). Additional circuit court decisions applying claim preclusion have been decided.
E.M.C. Mortgage Corp. v. Martin, 199 F.3d 1321 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding claim
preclusion applicable to claims that could have been previously presented); L-Tec Elecs.
Corp. v. Cougar Elec. Org., 198 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding claim preclusion
applicable even if claims based upon different legal theories, provided they arise from
the same transaction or occurrence); Rezzonico v. H. & R. Block, Inc., 182 F.3d 144 (2d
Cir. 1999) (finding claim preclusion applies to both those matters actually offered to
sustain the claim and those that might have been offered in the prior action); Zingher v.
Vermont Div. of Vocational Rehab., 165 F.3d 1015 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding claim
preclusion applicable to claims that could have been raised in earlier action).
48. 175 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 1999).
49. Retired employees brought an action alleging that their employer had violated
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") and Employee Retirement Income
Security Act by terminating the company's death benefit fund and that constituted a
violation of living adjustment for retirement benefits and violated several federal and
state laws. Id. at 123.
50. Id. at 128.
5 1. 972 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1992).
52. The plaintiff in Woods had waited more than three years to file her second
claim which was barred by claim preclusion. Id. at 38.
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We recognize that requiring a district judge to have a thorough familiarity
with the facts and legal issues in every single case on a district court's docket
is ludicrous given the heavy caseload district courts cany. In this case,
however, both Devlin cases were on the court's active calendar such that we
can conclude the district court could well have considered consolidating
53
them.

In Leather v. Ten ~ y c k , 'the
~ Second Circuit held plaintiffs civil
rights action was not barred by claim preclusion or issue preclusion.
The court, speaking through Judge Calabresi, held that the plaintiffs
action was not barred by res judicata because his criminal conviction
did not preclude an action for damages against the defendants."
Similarly, in Flaherty v.
the circuit court held that a student's
claims that disciplinary proceedings against him were instituted in
retaliation for his having exercised his rights under the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution were not barred by claim preclusion or issue preclusion.57
Finally, in United States Trust Co. v. ~enner,"the circuit held that a
judge's comments in litigation giving rise to settlement of the issue in
interpleader actions, suggesting that only those bondholders who had
purchased bonds before default date had a viable cause of action for
securities fraud, did not have claim preclusion or issue preclusion effect
in interpleader actions concerning distribution of settlement proceeds to
investor~.'~

A. Doctrine Applied

In Johnson v. ~rbitriurn,~'
shareholders had brought suit seeking a
declaratory judgment that they owned fifty-two percent of the
outstanding shares of stock of the defendant-corporation.
The
complaint was dismissed by the United States District Court for the
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Devlin, 175 F.3d at 130.
180 F.3d 420 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 422.
199 F.3d 607 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 615.
168 F.3d 630 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 633.
198 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 1999).
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District of Connecticut on issue preclusion grounds-the shareholders
appealed. A divided circuit court held that a previous decision by the
Delaware Court of Chancery, in an in rem proceeding, which
determined that plaintiffs did not own a majority of shares, precluded
them from obtaining a declaratory judgment to the contrary. The court
also held that due process concerns did not prevent the operation of the
doctrine of issue preclusion. District Court Judge Milton Shadur, sitting
by designation on the circuit court, dissented on the grounds that the
Delaware in rem proceeding did not constitute a binding determination
of ownership as between the conflicting claimants to stock ownership
because that issue determination was not necessary to the chancery
court's final j~dgment.~'
In Buford v. ~ o o m b e , the
~ ' circuit court reminded the bench and bar
that, under 28 U.S.C. 5 1738, a federal court must give to a state court
judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given to the judgment
under the law of the state in which the judgment was rendered.

B. Doctrine Not Applied
In an issue of first impression, the circuit court refused to apply
offensive issue preclusion to sentencing findings in a subsequent civil
proceeding. In Securities Exchange Commission v. Monarch Funding
63
Corp., the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") moved for
summary judgment on issue preclusion grounds based on findings of
fact rendered by the court at a sentencing proceeding. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary
judgment for the SEC and permanently enjoined the defendant from
claiming future securities violations. The circuit court held that: (1)
application of offensive issue preclusion to sentencing findings, in a
subsequent civil proceeding, is not per se prohibited, but precluding
relitigation on the basis of such findings should be presumed improper;
and (2) application of issue preclusion to preclude the defendant from
relitigating his liability for securities fraud, based on prior sentencing
findings, was improper. This case is significant because the appellant
had argued that sentencing findings should never be given preclusive
effect in civil litigation. This contention was supported by various
amici. The circuit court declined to adopt this sweeping per se
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 347.
199 F.3d 1321 (2d Cir. 1999).
192 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 1999).
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prohibition. Judge Joseph McLaughlin set forth a four part test for use
of the doctrine. First, the issues in both proceedings must be identical.
Second, the issue in the prior proceeding must have been actually
litigated and actually decided. Third, there must have been a full and
fair opportunity for litigation in the prior proceeding. Fourth, the issue
previously litigated must have been necessary to support a valid and
final judgment on the merits. Judge McLaughlin then explained:
First, a plenary civil trial affords a defendant procedural opportunities that are
unavailable at sentencing and that could command a different result. . . .
Second, the incentive to litigate a sentencing finding is frequently less intense,
and certainly more fraught with risk, than it would be for a full-blown civil
trial. . . . Finally, a defendant, though uniquely knowledgeable about that
64
underlying events, may be reluctant to testify during sentencing.

In United States v. ~ u s s e i nthe
, ~ ~circuit court again adopted and
explained the four-part test for application of issue preclusion. The
court refused to apply the doctrine because the issue in the prior
proceeding was not actually decided. The court stated:
The rationale for the principle that preclusive effect will be given only to those
findings that are necessary to a prior judgment is that a collateral issue,
although it may be the subject of a finding, is less likely to receive close
judicial attention and the parties may well have only limited incentive to
66
litigate the issue fully since it is not determinative.

The court's conclusion that issue preclusion will not be given to
alternative findings of fact is not the law in the State of New ~ o r k . ~ '
Hence, in federal diversity cases, district courts may sometimes apply
the doctrine to fact finding that was not necessary to a prior judgment.
IV. SPECIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES
68

In National Labor Relations Board v. Thalbo Corp., the circuit
court recognized a "special considerations" rule that may counsel
against application of claim preclusion or issue preclusion against a
government agency seeking to enforce federal law. Also, in Morris v.
64. Id. at 305.
65. 178 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 1999).
66. Id. at 129 (quoting Commercial Assocs. v. Tilcon Grammino, Inc., 998 F.2d
1092, 1097 (1st Cir. 1993)).
67. See Malloy v. Trombly, 50 N.Y.2d 46,51,405 N.E.2d 213,215-16 (1980).
68. 171 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 1999).
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~ i n d a u , ~the
' court explained when a settlement agreement should be
given res judicata effect. In Morris, a police chief and his son brought
civil rights actions against a town and its officials, claiming that
retaliatory acts had been committed in response to the police chief's
speech. The chief claimed he was constructively demoted in retaliation
for exercising his First Amendment rights. The claim was based on
amendments to town procedures substituting a town supervisor for the
police chief. These amendments occurred in a resolution deemed to be
part of a settlement agreement resolving a prior civil rights lawsuit by
the chief and, thus, were given claim preclusive effect.

During the survey year, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit issued numerous unpublished summary orders," each stating:
69. 196 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 1999).
70. Antonelli v. United States, No. 98-2972, 2000 WL 31 1066 (2d Cir. Mar. 27,
2000); Richard Feiner & Co. v. H.R. Indust., No. 98-9390, 1999 WL 385763 (2d Cir.
June 4, 1999); United States v. Walker, No. 98-1591, 1999 WL 385758 (2d Cir. June 4,
1999); Young v. Coughlin, No. 98-3717, 1999 WL 385757 (2d Cir. June 4, 1999);
Packard v. United States, No. 98-6223, 1999 WL 500797 (2d Cir. June 1, 1999); Clark
v. Mercado, No. 98-7934, 1999 WL 373889 (2d Cir. May 28, 1999); Ortiz v. Coughlin,
No. 97-2588, 1999 WL 197191 (2d Cir. Apr. 1, 1999); United States v. Ahmad, No. 981480, 1999 WL 197190 (2d Cir. Mar. 31, 1999); United States v. Luisi, No. 98-1616,
1999 WL 197218 (2d Cir. Mar. 26, 1999); United States v. Arce, No. 98-1279, 1999
WL 197215 (2d Cir. Mar. 26, 1999); United States v. Tavarez, No. 94-1575, 1999 WL
197214 (2d Cir. Mar. 26, 1999); Butts v. City of New York Dept. of Hous. Pres. & Dev.,
No. 98-7209, 1999 WL 187912 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 1999);United States v. Rosier, No. 981485, 1999 WL 197217 (2d Cir. Mar. 24, 1999); United States v. Palacios, Nos. 981458,98-1459, 1999 WL 197216 (2d Cir. Mar. 24, 1999); Loli v. Citibank, Inc., No. 987219, 1999 WL 187913 (2d Cir. Mar. 24, 1999); Rivers v. Comm., No. 98-4042, 1999
WL 197219 (2d Cir. Mar. 23, 1999); Habiniak v. Renssalaer City Mun. Corp., No. 987817, 1999 WL 164950 (2d Cir. Mar. 22, 1999); United States v. Blackwell., Nos. 971143(L), 97-1242(CON), 97-1 144(CON), 97-1 173(CON), 1999 WL 163980 (2d Cir.
Mar. 18, 1999); Best v. Miller, No. 98-7677, 1999 WL 147050 (2d Cir. Mar. 15, 1999);
McAllan v. Malatzky, No. 98-7218, 1999 WL 146300 (2d Cir. Mar. 15, 1999);
Labensky v. Rozzi, No. 98-7512, 1999 WL 146292 (2d Cir. Mar. 15, 1999); Wells v.
New York City Dept. of Corr., No. 98-2039, 1999 WL 132176 (2d Cir. Mar. 11, 1999);
United States v. Fulton, No. 97-1681, 1999 WL 132172 (2d Cir. Mar. 9, 1999); ReyesAponte v. City of New York Dept. of Corr., No. 98-7672, 1999 WL 132182 (2d Cir.
Mar. 8, 1999); Then v. United States, No. 97-2867, 1999 WL 132234 (2d Cir. Mar. 5,
1999); Geathers v. Morgenthau, No. 97-2640, 1999 WL 132233 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1999);
United States v. Gibson, No. 98-1334, 1999 WL 132232 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1999); United
States v. Frierson, No. 98-1 185, 1999 WL 132231 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1999); United States
v. Burgos, No. 98-1174, 1999 WL 132230 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1999); United States v.
Ardakian, No. 98-1359, 1999 WL 132228 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1999); Albert v. Strack, No.
98-2350, 1999 WL 132226 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1999); Ige v. United States, No. 98-2419,
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RES JUDICATA DEVELOPMENTS

THIS SUMMARY ORDER WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE
FEDERAL REPORTER AND MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENTIAL
AUTHORITY TO THIS OR ANY OTHER COURT, BUT MAY BE
CALLED TO THE AlTENTION OF THIS OR ANY OTHER COURT IN A
SUBSEQUENT STAGE OF THIS CASE, IN A RELATED CASE, OR IN
ANY CASE FOR PURPOSES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR RES
JUDICATA.

These summary orders involve pro se complaints filed by plaintiffs
in the circuit's federal district courts. They are generally unknown to
the practicing bar. The intent of the orders are to prevent pro se parties
from relitigating claims that could have been brought in a prior action
and from relitigating issue determinations necessary to a final judgment
in a different cause of action previously litigated in the circuit.
The circuit's summary order procedure is arguably unfair to pro se
litigants who should not be expected to understand res judicata
1999 WL 132217 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1999); Gyadu v. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, No. 987638, 1999 WL 132213 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1999); Moskowitz v. Hammons, No. 98-7664,
1999 WL 132212 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1999); Bumpus v. Warden, No. 98-2406, 1999 WL
132218 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 1999); Suzio Concrete Co., Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.,
No. 98-4106, 98-4136, 1999 WL 132216 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 1999); Turk v. Turk, No. 985025, 1999 WL 130204 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 1999); Capton v. City of Niagara Falls, Nos.
98-7018, 98-7072, 1999 WL 130202 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 1999); Ibrahim v. New York State
Dept. of Health, No. 98-7709, 1999 WL 128863 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 1999); Hanley v.
Deluxe Caterers of Shelter Rock, Inc., Nos. 98-7586 L, 98-7716, 1999 WL 130669 (2d
Cir. Mar. 3, 1999); Nationwide Mut. Fire Insur. Co. v. Coolidge, No. 98-7654, 1999 WL
130189 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 1999); United States v. Piggott, No. 97-1715, 1999 WL 110423
(2d Cir. Mar. 1, 1999); Wynn v. Nationwide Insur. Co., No. 98-5003, 1999 WL 106218
(2d Cir. Feb. 26, 1999); Constantinescu v. Dentsply Equip., No. 98-7543, 1999 WL
106217 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 1999); Summer Communications, Inc. v. Three A's Holding,
LLC, No. 97-9095, 1999 WL 106216 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 1999); States v. Beckerman, No.
98-6195, 1999 WL 97237 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1999); Kulniszewski v. Swist, No. 98-7487,
1999 WL 97362 (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 1999); United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, No. 98-6074, 1999 WL
97236 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1999); Johnson v. St. Clare's Hosp. & Health Ctr., No. 98-7831,
1999 WL 97232 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1999); Howard v. Pierce, No. 97-2854, 1999 WL
97239 (2d Cir. Feb. 23, 1999); Demeritt v. Town of Brunswick, No. 98-7509, 1999 WL
97238 (2d Cir. Feb. 23, 1999); Grandi v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 97-9309,
1999 WL 96128 (2d Cir. Feb. 22, 1999); United States v. Castillo, No. 98-1 172, 1998
WL 995131 (2d Cir. Feb. 19, 1999); Davis v. United States, No. 97-2265, 1999 WL
96144 (2d Cir. Feb. 19, 1999); Dean v. Abrams, No. 97-7462, 1999 WL 96140 (2d Cir.
Feb. 18, 1999); Manners v. New York, No. 97-9424, 1999 WL 96136 (2d Cir. Feb. 18,
1999); United States v. Terdik, No. 98-1321, 1998 WL 995130 (2d Cir. Feb. 17, 1999);
United States v. Bartels, No. 98-1347, 1999 WL 96137 (2d Cir. Feb. 17, 1999); Big
Bros. Sportswear, Inc. v. Third Rail, Inc., No. 97-9507, 1998 WL 995129 (2d Cir. Feb.
17, 1999); Rankel v. Acrish, No. 98-7281, 1999 WL 65137 (2d Cir. Feb. 8, 1999);
Salten v. Nat'l Trans. Safety Bd., No. 98-4123, 1999 WL 48781 (2d Cir. Feb. 3, 1999);
Marel v. Lord, No. 98-2453, 1999 WL 126685 (2d Cir. Jan. 21, 1999).
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principles. Fairness is a fundamental societal goal of res judicata.
Principles of finality may be important for conservation of judicial
resources in the circuit but, at the very least, pro se litigants should be
alerted as to how the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion
can be used against them. Summary orders should not be issued unless
the record shows the litigant was given "notice" of the res judicata
implications of his or her case prior to the proceeding and judgment.

VI. CONCLUSION
Crowded court dockets in the circuit and the increase of civil
rights, Title VII, and employment termination cases, along with pro se
filings should result in the expanded use of claim preclusion and issue
preclusion during the 2000-2001 Survey Year.
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